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n 1912 the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) cemented its 
position as the leading force in the international socialist movement 
by becoming the first social democratic party to achieve a plurality 
of votes in a national election. Two years later the SPD became the 
first social democratic party to vote credits for war. In January 1919, 
after Germany’s military defeat in the First World War, Social 
Democratic Interior Minister Gustav Noske of the provisional 
government ordered the violent suppression of a revolt led by the 
Spartacist League, whose leaders Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg 
were former party comrades. The extrajudicial murders of Liebknecht 
and Luxemburg by paramilitary right-wing forces (Freikorps) came to 
symbolize the definitive division of Germany’s socialist movement, a 
division that persisted through the period of the Weimar Republic and 
contributed to the impotence displayed by German Social Democrats 
before the ascent of Adolf Hitler’s German National Socialist Workers’ 
Party (NSDAP) in the waning years of Weimar democracy.  
 By 1918 the Social Democrats were split into three parties: the 
Majority Social Democrats (MSPD), the Independent Social Democrats 
(USPD), and the Spartacist League, which on January 1, 1919 changed 
its name to the German Communist Party (KPD). This schism was the 
consequence of a protracted struggle over the SPD’s support for the 
German war effort and the party’s reconciliation with the Imperial State 
from 1914 to 1918. Yet the origins of the split went back several decades. 
They can be seen in the conflicting pressures within the party about how 
to operate after the Anti-Socialist Law that had formally banned public 
party activities ended in 1890. The rapid industrial growth that marked 
Germany’s transition into a world power was accompanied by an equally 
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rapid ascent in membership and votes for the Social Democrats. This 
growth created unprecedented opportunities for the party to influence 
contemporary developments. However, a deepening of economic 
inequality in the context of a general rise in living standards, the growth 
of an international socialist movement in a time of militarism and 
imperialist threats to peace by an increasingly assertive German 
Weltpolitik, and the coming of age of a German democratic culture in the 
midst of hyper-nationalism and political authoritarianism set the contours 
for an acrimonious series of disputes within the SPD.   
The immediate cause for intra-party crises that culminated in the 
withdrawal of many leading Social Democrats from the SPD during 
WWI were contrasting demands concerning party tactics on issues such 
as SPD votes in the Reichstag and extra-parliamentary pressure, in 
particular the debates revolving around the mass strike. These tactical 
disputes were rooted in antithetical strategic orientations of the three 
party factions, generally referred to as reformist, centrist, and radical. 
This paper seeks to demonstrate that the leading theorists of the major 
factions developed strategies irreconcilable with one another within the 
framework of a unified party. Further, these strategies represented 
contrasting conceptions of economic evolution and political power in 
Imperial Germany and Europe. The leading theorists of each faction 
stressed different aspects of the political and economic constellation in 
Germany to such a degree that they often seemed to be describing vastly 
different countries. These conflicting conceptualizations of the nature of 
the Imperial state and economy and the strategies which each faction 
developed from them provide the context for the split of German Social 
Democracy and made some sort of decisive break necessary if each 
faction was to attempt the pursuit of the strategies it advocated. The 
schism existed in embryonic form in the years immediately preceding 
WWI as factional lines on theory and tactics hardened. These disputes 
intensified in the second decade of the twentieth century, as radicals 
became convinced that a revolutionary tactic was the only means of 
preventing war in Europe. By 1914 the deep polarization within the SPD 
served to paralyze much of the party’s freedom to maneuver in an 
increasingly dangerous internal and external climate. 
Here I analyze the theoretical, strategic, and tactical positions of four 
leading SPD theorists: Karl Kautsky and Rudolf Hilferding of the centrist 
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faction, the reformist Eduard Bernstein, and the radical Rosa Luxemburg. 
I have chosen these four theorists not necessarily because they were most 
representative of their movements. Bernstein, for instance, found himself 
often isolated from other reformists in the SPD and, because of his 
opposition to the German war effort, he later joined the USPD with his 
former party opponents Hilferding, Kautsky (before all three reintegrated 
in the SPD with the remnants of the USPD), and Luxemburg (who later 
left to join the Spartacists). Rather, I analyze their writings because (a) 
contemporaries recognized them as the intellectual leaders of their 
factions (Schorske, 19-21); (b) they achieved international prominence 
and had a great influence on debates within European socialism as a 
whole; (c) they frequently cited each other as a basis for their polemics; 
and (d) of the rich journalism of pre-WWI German Social Democracy 
their economic and political analyses of the development of international 
capitalism and German government and society were the most 
comprehensive. I then conclude with a brief overview of the strategic 
disputes within the party in the lead-up to the First World War.  
 
KARL KAUTSKY AND THE “ERFURT SYNTHESIS” 
 
Carl Schorske employs the phrase “Erfurt synthesis” to describe the 
common and uniting features of the party that emerged after the lapsing 
of the Bismarck-era Anti-Socialist laws (Schorske, 6). It was the 
progressive unraveling of this synthesis from 1898 to 1914 that resulted 
in the party’s schism during the First World War and the fratricidal 
battles at the dawning of the Weimar Republic. The Erfurt party 
congress, held in 1891, approved a party platform that remained in effect 
until the Weimar era. In the section written by Kautsky, the platform 
formalized the party’s adherence to Marxism and proclaimed the party’s 
goal to be the overthrow of the capitalist economy and society. At the 
same time, Bernstein laid out in the platform’s second section demands 
for economic reform and democratic rights that the party should pursue 
in the present in order to improve the status of workers within the 
existing economy and authoritarian political system. Though the dual 
nature of the platform carried the seeds of the future divergence, 
Bernstein and Kautsky generally shared a common view during this 
period, as well as a close friendship.  The program continued the party’s 
tradition of pairing a revolutionary rhetoric with the reformist practice of 
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participating in parliamentary structures at the national and local levels. 
The Erfurt Congress commissioned Kautsky to publish an extended 
pamphlet laying out the theory of the party in a comprehensive, yet 
accessible, manner. The result was The Class Struggle, which became 
Kautsky’s most widely read and translated work (Steenson, 1978, 99).  
As a close collaborator of Friedrich Engels in the final years of the 
latter’s life, Kautsky presented himself as the carrier of Karl Marx and 
Engel’s legacy into the twentieth century. In The Class Struggle, Kautsky 
put forth what is often described as an “orthodox” Marxist interpretation 
of the evolution of the capitalist economy. Kautsky reasserted Marx’s 
late theory of collective immiseration, writing that “the majority of 
people sink ever deeper in want and misery (Kautsky, 1892, 43).” 
Farmers, merchants and small producers were progressively approaching 
proletarian conditions. Even if this was not evidenced in a decline in the 
number of businesses operated by small producers, Kautsky identified a 
nebulous “debasement of their character” and an increase in the 
precariousness of their position. The capitalist class was narrowing as 
large producers increasingly monopolized the means of production. 
Kautsky claimed that periods of prosperity were declining in length, as 
the severity of crises, caused by overproduction and a declining rate of 
profit, both inherent and inextricable results of a capitalist economy, 
intensified. As the productive capacity of society increased, the fixed 
portion of production grew over the variable portion, meaning machines 
were progressively displacing workers. A steady growth in the number of 
unemployed resulted, along with a decline in the purchasing power of the 
majority of the population. The consequence would be more products 
than ever before, and less means for people to purchase them. A crisis 
would inevitably follow. Economic crises resulted in the bankruptcies of 
less productive small enterprises and therefore an increase in the 
concentration of capital and production. The Manchester School of 
liberal free-trade no longer held sway over the international capitalist 
class (Kautsky, 1892, 106). Cartels were becoming a defining feature of 
economic life in the leading industrial countries, as capitalists attempted 
to shield their profits by eliminating competition in their sectors. 
However, cartels would never be able to fully regulate the economy 
because they remained national in scope, and trusts were divided by 
sectors. The pernicious effects of international competition led to the 
increase in armaments spending and militarism that so marked the last 
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decades of nineteenth-century Europe and these trends were accelerating. 
Kautsky identified what he considered a contradiction at the heart of 
capitalism. He wrote, “Commerce demands peace, but competition leads 
to war” (Kautsky, 1892, 203). In order to combat the tendency of profits 
to decline, capitalists had to turn to unexploited regions of the world. 
However, the economy had already become global, and there was a 
definite limit to the potential extension of markets. Governments, 
increasingly dependant upon the capitalist class, sought to increase their 
own prosperity by expanding their political boundaries and colonizing 
other peoples. This “need of expansion caused by the capitalist system of 
production (…) is the most powerful cause of the militarism which has 
turned Europe into a military camp” (Kautsky, 1892, 104). The growth in 
credit mechanisms exacerbated the impact of crises. As crises intensified, 
the capitalist class would become increasingly desperate in the search for 
profits until capitalism collapsed under its own contradictions.  
Historian Dieter Groh describes the strategy Karl Kautsky derived for 
the SPD from his theory as “revolutionary attentisme” (Groh, 57-59). 
Kautsky claimed that the contradictions inherent in capitalism were 
intensifying and that capitalism and the monarchy would be overthrown 
in a revolution, though this might be brought about through the 
abdication of the ruling class rather than through violence (Salvadori, 33-
34). He perceived the revolutionary process mechanistically and working 
class and party action against the state as futile until objective conditions 
made a revolution inevitable. The SPD would emerge to fill the power 
vacuum and lead Germany towards socialism. The party could do little to 
hasten this process because historical developments involved the 
inevitable unfolding of contradictions inherent to the system. As Kautsky 
wrote in 1893, the SPD “was a revolutionary party, but not a party that 
makes revolutions” (Salvadori, 40). The pace of these developments 
would largely be set by the ability of the bourgeoisie to adapt itself to the 
challenges of capitalist evolution. Hence the primary function of the 
party was to educate the workers and protect itself against state 
repression so that the party could fulfill its historic function once the 
moment for revolution had arrived. Elections and the quest for a SPD 
parliamentary majority were central to this strategy, and Kautsky echoed 
the elder Engel’s view that such a majority would represent in fact the 
realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most important task 
of the party was to maintain a pure Marxist theory so that it would 
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properly understand its role in the historical process and be ready to lead 
the workers towards revolution when conditions were ripe and to direct 
them following their victory. Kautsky only accepted alliances with liberal 
parties as tactical, temporary measures to pursue specific goals. The party 
should continue its rejectionist attitude toward the government and 
parliament, while avoiding any premature revolutionary initiatives. This 
static tactic came to frustrate the more activist wings of the party eager 
for a more dynamic strategy, fueling a challenge from reformist and, 
then, radical party critics. 
 
EDUARD BERNSTEIN AND THE REVISIONIST CHALLENGE  
 
Influenced by his years of exile in England, where he was long 
exposed to the ideas of Fabian reformists, and in the context of an 
economic upswing that began in 1895, Eduard Bernstein published The 
Preconditions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy in 1899. 
Bernstein’s book, which one historian calls “the bible of 
reformism” (Gneuss, 40), argued that the SPD must abandon its 
revolutionary principles, remove references to class warfare from its 
propaganda, and seek alliances with liberal parties. After a criticism of 
Hegelian dialectics, historical materialism, and “Blanquist” tendencies 
within Marx’s writings, Bernstein arrived at the heart of his argument. 
Marxism, as with any theory, must be tested against empirical evidence 
and his book extensively employed statistics on the development of 
capitalism since Marx’s death in an effort to prove that Marx’s depiction 
of economic trends ran counter to objective conditions. As opposed to the 
claim that the proletariat would gradually subsume the agricultural and 
middle classes, Bernstein argued that there had been a relative and 
absolute increase in property owners. The number of employees in mid-
range and small businesses was increasing, though not at the same rate as 
those of large enterprises. While he admitted to having no information on 
the distribution of stock ownership among income groups, Bernstein 
wrote that the number of stockholders in England (which he described as 
still the most advanced capitalist country) was increasing, as well as their 
average holdings. In Prussia most of the proletariat continued to be 
employed in small and middle-sized businesses as of 1895. These 
enterprises remained competitive, according to Bernstein, because their 
size made them more compatible with certain types of production, the 
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expansion of large-scale businesses fed and bred smaller companies, and 
direct access to consumers made smaller businesses better situated in 
trades such as baking. Large and small businesses were often not in direct 
competition. Only the smallest businesses were declining. Bernstein 
concluded that there was no evidence that any substantial economic 
sector, including small-scale trade and farming, was in decline. Rather, 
all sectors were expanding with the overall economy, though not at the 
same rates. 
Bernstein did not reject all of the trends of economic development 
identified by Marx. He agreed that there was an increasing concentration 
of industrial capital, a tendency to overproduce, repeated economic 
crises, and an increase in the rate of surplus-value extraction (Lehnert, 
369). However, he took issue with Marx’s contention that an increase in 
the rate of surplus value meant an increase in exploitation, noting that the 
rate of surplus value was greater among highly paid industrial workers 
than unskilled labor. In so doing, Bernstein denied the empirical basis of 
Marx’s theory of value, declaring it to be “a pure thought construction” 
and stated that surplus value was not an accurate standard for measuring 
exploitation. As part of his general campaign against the objective 
foundations of scientific socialism, Bernstein argued that the lasting 
worth of Marx’s theory of value lay in the “moral-ethical dimensions of 
the economic relationships [it] uncover[ed]” (Lehnert, 315).  
In addition, Bernstein identified what he considered counter-trends 
that stemmed from, and perhaps even overcame, the tendency for the rate 
of profit to decline. The expansion of capital’s reach in an age of 
imperialism, the increased pace of transportation and communications, 
and the elasticity and advancement of the credit system all boded poorly 
for an imminent collapse of the capitalist system. Most importantly, 
cartelization meant an increase in rationalization and control, decreasing 
the threat of the tendency to overproduce (Hohorst, 323). As the capitalist 
system became more rationalized, Bernstein predicted that speculation 
would decline and the impact of local disturbances on the world market 
would lessen. In contrast to Kautsky, Bernstein argued that intensive 
rather than extensive exploitation was more prevalent in capitalist 
expansion, meaning that economic expansion in already existing markets 
was a larger factor in capitalist growth than the acquisition of new 
markets. Bernstein concluded that “no a priori limit can be set for this 
intensive exploitation of the world market” (Bernstein, 1899, 90). 
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Therefore capitalism was entering a period of stabilization and crises 
were becoming less, rather than more, severe in length and intensity, 
despite Marx’s predictions to the contrary. Bernstein viewed England as 
the model for capitalist development and envisaged Germany developing 
in the direction of a Gladstonian social compromise. He portrayed 
Germany’s future as England’s present. 
Within this context of capitalist stabilization, Bernstein advanced the 
view that capitalist societies were progressively growing towards 
socialism. He identified the growth of cooperatives and municipal 
socialism as important components of this process and described the 
expansion of the number of stock-holders as representing a process of 
economic democratization. The key element in the evolution towards 
socialism, however, was democracy. Bernstein writes: 
In England, as in Switzerland, and also in France, the United States, 
the Scandinavian countries, etc. [democracy] has proved to be a powerful 
level of social progress. Whoever looks not at the label but at the content 
will find—if he examines the legislation in England since the electoral 
reform of 1867, which gave urban workers the vote—a very significant 
advance in the direction of socialism, if not socialism itself (Bernstein, 
1899, 143).  
Bernstein argued that the universal franchise could be used by the 
SPD as an “alternative to revolution” (Bernstein, 1899, 145). The SPD 
should align its theory with its practice by unambiguously committing 
itself to democratization and abandoning phraseology such as the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. He described the party’s revolutionary 
rhetoric and theory as a direct threat to democratization efforts because it 
pushed the monarchy towards reaction and made liberal parties reluctant 
to ally with the Social Democrats in a push for electoral reform. Unlike 
many other reformists in the SPD, Bernstein saw the mass strike as a 
legitimate method to achieve democratic reforms and argued that, if the 
German state attempted to abolish voting rights, the working class could 
respond with revolution (Grebing & Kramme, 70; Lehnert, 373). 
Bernstein argued that capitalist stabilization, however, made a 
revolution improbable and unlikely to succeed. Even if such a revolution 
occurred, it would be tarnished and constrained by the violent destruction 
that had engendered it. The Imperial government, according to Bernstein, 
was capable of overseeing real social and political reform and the best 
strategy for the SPD to exploit this potential and defend the interests of 
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the working class was to integrate the party, unions, and workers into the 
Imperial system in order to strengthen the democratic forces within it.  
 
KARL KAUTSKY AND RUDOLF HILFERDING RESPOND 
 
Bernstein’s polemic unleashed a furious counter-attack from the 
defenders of what had been the party’s traditional strategy and theory 
since the Erfurt Program. Karl Kautsky’s role as the party’s quasi-official 
theoretician and his close ties to party leader August Bebel made his role 
in the revisionist controversy of paramount importance. He dedicated 
himself to disproving the details and conclusions expressed in 
Bernstein’s revisionist tract (Lehnert, 357).  
In The Social Revolution, a pamphlet developed from a lecture and 
published in 1901, Kautsky acknowledged that “never was the rate of 
economic development more rapid” (Kautsky, 1901, 35). Wages were 
rising as Bernstein had noted but, according to Kautsky, this was only a 
part of the story. Profits were rising much faster than wages and the 
capitalist standard of living was increasing at a much higher rate than that 
of the proletariat. Kautsky conceded to Bernstein that figures revealed 
that wages had increased in England from 1860 to 1891. However, 
Kautsky claimed that English wages made up a progressively smaller 
proportion of the total social wealth (Kautsky, 1901, 41). Maintaining 
Marx’s theory, Kautsky claimed that the extraction of surplus value, and 
therefore exploitation, was steadily increasing. In addition, the rise in 
wages and living conditions of the proletariat was not a symptom of 
capitalist development, but rather resulted from the increasing strength 
and ability of organized labor to pressure the government for an 
amelioration of its conditions. If left unhindered, Kautsky declared, 
capitalism would progressively pauperize the working class.  
Defending the party’s traditional strategy, Kautsky attacked 
Bernstein’s depiction of conditions in England, the role of England in the 
world economy, and the conclusions that one should derive from the 
English situation. Kautsky declared that since the publication of Capital 
“England has ceased to be the classic land of capitalism” and now “our 
(German) state shows England’s future in capitalist 
development” (Kautsky, 1901, 61). He argued that there was a steady 
increase in government and employer coercion in England, accompanied 
by an intensification of the class struggle. The English political model 
ANTICIPATING THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC SCHISM 28 
was under increasing strain and though compromise there was “farthest 
developed,” this was not evidence of the advanced state of England but 
rather showed that the United States and Germany had surpassed 
England’s development (Kautsky, 1901, 26). Stock-holding did not 
represent a democratization of capitalism, but was rather a means for the 
wealthy to get their hands on the money of the lower classes. 
Municipalities under Social Democratic control tended to be the poorest 
and did not have the means to propel Germany towards socialism. 
Cooperatives were weak and could never compete with the forces of 
capitalist accumulation. The growth of capitalism into socialism was a 
“utopia” of Bernstein’s creation (Kautsky, 1901, 83).  
In the end, for Kautsky, the struggle for socialism was a question of 
power (Kautsky, 1901, 118). The capitalist class was appropriating for 
itself an increasing proportion of the total social wealth and this was 
taken to be evidence of the validity of Marx’s predictions. The growth of 
militarism and bureaucracy, identified by Kautsky as much more 
advanced in Germany than in England, was a symptom of the latest phase 
of capitalist development. The capitalist class was increasingly aware of 
the revolutionary potential of the proletariat and was arming itself to 
resist; its crucial ally in this struggle was the state. A purely 
parliamentary tactic was doomed from the beginning because “at the 
same time that the influence of Social Democracy grows in Parliament, 
the influence of Parliament decreases” (Kautsky, 1901, 75). In addition, 
Kautsky stated that the strength of the financial sector was growing and 
that it was coming more and more to dominate industry. Kautsky claimed 
that the heightened international tensions between Germany on the one 
side, and England and France on the other, were the result of the 
influence of financial capitalists. He viewed the decline in the export of 
English goods to its colonies and the small value of French and German 
colonies for industrial development as evidence that colonization was no 
longer intended to provide markets for home goods, but rather served 
capitalism as territory for the exploitation of natural and human 
resources. As England lost its previously unassailable economic 
superiority and saw its colonial predominance challenged, capitalist 
concerns in various countries turned to the state to protect and, especially 
in the German case, extend, the reach of its interests, leading to 
increasingly hostile relations between the advanced capitalist countries. 
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In what was to become a classic in the study of imperialism, Rudolf 
Hilferding, a protégé of Kautsky and twice Finance Minister during the 
Weimar era, laid out a systematic analysis of capitalist development in 
his 1910 exegesis, Finance Capital, a direct reply to Bernstein 
(Smaldone, 41). The most distinctive feature, according to Hilferding, of 
the latest phase of capitalism was the rapid growth of cartels and the 
increasing interrelationship between finance and industrial capital. A lack 
of investment capital caused German industry to become increasingly 
reliant for its expansion on bank loans. Long-term loans increased 
industries’ dependence on banks, and as the banks became more 
financially invested in these industries, they became more interested in 
overseeing and, when possible, directing, the industrial strategy of these 
enterprises. Cartelization was partly a consequence of these investments 
because banks, financially involved in a large host of enterprises, 
perceived that their interests would be best protected by curtailing 
competition and coordinating the various enterprises of an industrial 
sector. A considerable personnel overlap developed on corporate and 
bank boards. In this more advanced form of capitalist organization, 
capitalists saw free trade and competition as pernicious to profits and 
turned to protective tariffs to maintain artificially high price levels 
independent of productive costs. Technological improvements and 
increased productivity were no longer reflected in lower prices. In 
addition to an increase in exploitation resulting from a higher rate of 
surplus value extraction, tariffs acted as “an indirect tax on the domestic 
population” forcing consumers to pay artificially high prices for basic 
goods (Hilferding, 308). The SPD in this period consistently agitated for 
lower tariffs, especially those on agricultural products, because higher 
prices depressed real wages. Tariff levels, established by the state, made 
tariffs the focal point of “a political struggle for power among various 
industrial groups” (Hilferding, 312) as they sought to influence state 
protectionist policies to their advantage. Cartelization allowed large 
businesses to confront the state in a united manner and more effectively 
pressure it to protect their interests. 
As concentration of banking and industrial capital progressed, more 
wealth fell into the hands of fewer people, exacerbating class differences 
and intensifying the struggle between classes. Hilferding identified what 
we would today call insider-trading on the stock market. He described 
well-connected investors manipulating the market and taking advantage 
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of inside information to profit at the expense of small investors, who 
were devoid of such connections. Countering the importance that 
Bernstein assigned to the persistence of small businesses, Hilferding 
claimed that these businesses were becoming increasingly dependent 
upon large businesses, whose products they sold. A small business 
became “a mere agent of the capitalist” (Hilferding, 212). It was also 
here where the class struggle was most bitter because retail and other 
small operations had the lowest rates of profit and were most vulnerable 
to growing working-class assertiveness. The rapid pace of production in 
Germany created an acute shortage of labor. This worked to the 
advantage of the trade unions, allowing them to overcome the 
pauperization of the laboring class that Marx had predicted in the 
advanced capitalist countries. Small businesses became more reliant on 
large businesses to counter the claims of labor and keep the workers in 
line. The prospects for an alliance with this class against the large 
capitalist concerns were thus extremely limited. Hilferding also discussed 
“the new middle class” of bureaucrats and technicians. He predicted that 
the rapid increase in the numbers of this class would push past the 
saturation point, causing their wages to progressively decrease toward 
proletarian levels. However, the contempt that this class had for the 
proletariat meant that their political views would not soon match their 
deteriorating conditions and this class would therefore remain an 
implacable foe of the laboring class for the foreseeable future. There 
were at present no economic or political grounds for the alliances 
Bernstein sought. The working class and, hence, the SPD, would have to 
struggle alone.  
Hilferding concluded that cartelization was an ameliorating factor of 
the tendency for the rate of profit to fall but could not overcome the 
impact of overproduction. Crises would therefore continue and would be 
aggravated by credit mechanisms, as opposed to Bernstein’s claim. This 
was because credit tended to be most abundant during times of prosperity 
and to dry up just at the moment during a recession when it was most 
needed. Cartels also limited the opportunities for domestic investment, 
leading financiers to turn increasingly to the export of capital. The acute 
shortage of labor power resulted in an intensified colonization with the 
goal of creating a free-wage colonial proletariat. This involved 
considerable violence as the principle means to achieve this was to 
uproot people from their traditional modes of life and to expropriate their 
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land. A power struggle between national banking groups for spheres of 
influence for investment made imperialism dangerous to the maintenance 
of peace in Europe. Germany was in a disadvantageous position in the 
acquisition of new markets compared to its rivals. Russia and the United 
States had substantial frontier internal markets to exploit while Holland, 
France and England could rely on their considerable colonial holdings. 
With the 1905 Morocco crisis in mind, Hilferding argued that as 
Germany sought to break out of its central European containment and 
threatened French colonies, it risked conflict with England and France. 
Bernstein responded to Hilferding by challenging the empirical basis of 
his conclusions and arguing that the depiction of finance capital and the 
bourgeoisie as uniform entities was erroneous (Bernstein, 1911d, 947-
955). In his view, many capitalists were harmed by protectionist policies 
and would support liberal parties who were committed to lowering 
tariffs, opening a door for a broader liberal-socialist alliance. 
Until 1910 Kautsky, Hilferding, and Bebel fought to maintain the 
Erfurt Synthesis against the efforts of reformists to achieve cross-class 
collaboration and a positive role for the SPD parliamentary delegation in 
Imperial politics. Kautsky continued to insist that this would constitute a 
fundamental betrayal of socialist principles. However, this group was 
soon to be challenged from another flank as an organized radical 
opposition emerged in the decade leading up to the First World War. 
Struggling against reformist pretensions on the one hand, and calls for 
revolutionary agitation on the other, the center coalesced to defend the 
party’s established theory and strategy.  
 
ROSA LUXEMBURG AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A  
RADICAL ALTERNATIVE 
 
In 1899 Rosa Luxemburg published her critique of Bernstein’s 
reformism, Social Reform or Revolution, and began a long career of 
radical agitation that propelled her to prominence in the international 
socialist movement. Luxemburg criticized the validity of Bernstein’s 
economic conclusions in terms rather similar to Kautsky and Hilferding. 
Credit did not attenuate capitalist contradictions but rather sharpened 
them by expanding production beyond the capacity for consumption. 
Overproduction then led to crises in which credit disappeared as soon as 
it was most needed. Cartelization was a phase of capitalism meant to hold 
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off the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and it intensified the class 
struggle by increasing the conflict between producers and consumers in 
the struggle over tariffs. International clashes over tariff policy increased 
the hostility between various advanced capitalist countries. Share-holding 
increased the concentration of capital, rather than dispersing it as 
Bernstein claimed. Luxemburg wrote that it was not true that Marx 
predicted a definite rate of industrial concentration or the absolute 
disappearance of the petty bourgeoisie (Luxemburg, 1899, 146). She also 
claimed that Bernstein’s denial of a final general crisis was not 
compatible with his acceptance of the existence of crises. It was not 
possible, according to Luxemburg, to have only a little anarchy in the 
market. For her, the theory of the final breakdown of capitalism in a 
general crisis was “the cornerstone of scientific socialism (…) without 
[which] the expropriation of the capitalist class is 
impossible” (Luxemburg, 1899, 160). 
The heart of Luxemburg’s 1899 critique, however, lies in her analysis 
of the political situation. Luxemburg broke the alleged tie between 
capitalist development and the advance of democracy. She wrote that 
“democracy has been found in the most dissimilar social formations” 
while “absolutism and constitutional monarchy are found in the most 
varied economic contexts” (Luxemburg, 1899, 152). In Germany, there 
was no reason to expect a progressive growth of democracy, nor a 
bourgeois revolution bringing with it greater public liberties and a 
democratic form of government. The German bourgeoisie was “quite 
satisfied with a semi-feudal constitutional monarchy” (Luxemburg, 1899, 
152). The steady growth of the labor movement meant that liberal 
doctrines had become “a direct impediment” to capitalist aims. She 
writes: 
Turning to the present phase of bourgeois history, we also see here 
factors in the political situation which, instead of assuring the realization 
of Bernstein’s schema, lead rather to the abandonment by bourgeois 
society of the democratic conquests won up to the present (Luxemburg, 
1899, 153). 
Whereas reformists at this time stressed economic developments to 
bolster their case that the position of the worker was improving within 
German society, radicals tended to emphasize political developments 
such as the rise of militarism, imperialism, and the determined effort by 
the German government to prevent a democratization of the Reich. In her 
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future career as a leading, though often isolated, radical agitator, Rosa 
Luxemburg argued repeatedly that events proved that the governing 
aristocratic and economic elites, the latter organized into cartels and 
employers’ associations, would not permit a democratization of the 
German state out of fear of the assertion of working-class economic 
interests at the parliamentary level. She asked her readers to: 
Think of a theory of instituting socialism by means of social reform 
in the face of the complete stagnation of the reform movement in 
Germany (…) Consider the theory of winning a majority in parliament 
after the revision of the constitution of Saxony [creation of a class voting 
system] and the most recent attempts against universal suffrage 
(Luxemburg, 1899, 131).  
She concludes that: 
In view of the fact that bourgeois liberalism has sold its soul 
from fear of the growing labor movement and its final aim, it 
follows that the socialist labor movement today is and can be 
the only support of democracy. The fate of the socialist 
movement is not bound to bourgeois democracy; but the fate of 
democracy, on the contrary, is bound to the socialist movement 
(Luxemburg, 1899, 154).  
Luxemburg’s analysis at this time did not differ all that much from 
that of Kautsky, who told the 1901 SPD party congress that “there is only 
one democratic force, and that is the proletariat” and later wrote, “We 
expect not the development of social peace, but an intensification of 
social war” that must end in the seizure of “complete state power” by the 
proletariat (Salvatori, 68-69). However, Kautsky’s turn to the right 
following the internal party squabble about the prospects of a mass strike 
in Germany, and his determination not to pursue an offensive strategy 
against the Imperial state, led to conflict with Luxemburg. She developed 
a conception of historical developments that broke with that of Kautsky 
by emphasizing the importance of movement. She argued that, as the 
repressive power of the state expanded, the traditional passive tactics 
were insufficient. The working class lost ground when it stood still. The 
party and union leaderships were acting as brakes on the revolutionary 
aspirations of the rank-and-file. In an inversion of Vladimir Lenin’s 
conception of the revolutionary vanguard, Luxemburg asserted that the 
masses should act on and drive forward their union and party leaderships. 
Rather than an outcome of capitalist collapse and objective economic 
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conditions, the revolution would be the culmination of a series of mass 
actions that would steadily instill a greater sense of class consciousness 
within the working class. The workers would be the agents of historical 
transformation rather than its heirs. Luxemburg was willing to sacrifice 
the party organization and risk certain repression in order to set off the 
revolutionary current she believed ran beneath the surface of Imperial 
German society. By confronting the state and mobilizing the masses a 
movement would grow in size and determination until a majority came to 
support a socialist alternative. Then, for Luxemburg, the time would be 
ripe for the socialists to take power, and democracy and socialism would 
be born together in Germany. 
 
MOVEMENT TOWARD SCHISM, 1899-1914 
 
The revolutionary theory and isolationist strategy of the Erfurt 
program resulted in large part from the SPD’s experience of persecution 
during the Anti-Socialist Law. The program formulated a rejectionist, 
purely oppositional stance for the party in Imperial politics while 
designing an attentiste strategy for overthrowing and replacing these 
politics. The Center faction, led by Bebel and Kautsky, argued that 
revolutions could not be made by party dictation, but rather would be the 
culmination of a long-term historical evolution. In a period of drastic 
industrial, political, and international change, such a strategy was bound 
to give rise to opposition from members who were determined that the 
party influence events and assert the power the extraordinary growth in 
party and union membership and votes provided. However, among these 
voices of discontent were vastly opposing and mutually exclusive 
solutions, a widespread feeling of impotence and paralysis, as well as 
frustration at a party program that turned the party’s isolation into a 
virtue. Rapidly evolving events from the turn of the century forced the 
party to take positions that would necessarily upset influential sectors of 
the party membership. It was in these battles, fought out in journalistic 
polemics, party congresses, and eventually in the street during and 
following the First World War, that the theoretical disputes outlined 
above devolved into a factional war over party policy. These struggles 
increased in intensity in the lead up to 1914, as attitudes hardened and the 
factional split became a struggle for control of the major party 
institutions.  
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The first stirrings against the Erfurt consensus was a concerted effort 
by southern Social Democrats, mostly from Baden and Bavaria, for the 
SPD to adopt an agrarian program and permit the regional SPD sections 
to form alliances with liberal parties to achieve concrete reforms in the 
1890s. The Bavarian Social Democrat Georg von Vollmar and others 
argued that the slow pace of industrialization in southern Germany meant 
that class conflict was considerably lower than in the industrial north and 
that there were real prospects for enacting social legislation beneficial to 
workers and farmers (Schorske, 8). The party congress condemned the 
Baden regional party for violating party statutes by voting for state 
budgets, amidst growing calls from the radicals that the party expel them 
for indiscipline (Steenson, 1981, 158-59). Trade unions experienced a 
rapid growth in membership in the decades preceding the First World 
War and their size came to dwarf that of the party (Steenson, 1981, 93). 
Union leaders’ assertion of the power associated with this growth, 
although only gradual, would come to play a major, and perhaps decisive 
role in the intra-party strife that followed. Trade unionists from the 
beginning were reformists by inclination and action, and their tactics 
aroused the ire of center and radical elements. Their goal was immediate 
improvements in wages and working conditions and they opposed any 
party agitation that might threaten their achievements or attract 
repression of their organizations. The centrist party leadership fought to 
maintain its sovereignty against calls by southern sections for a 
federalization of the party and by trade unionists for the “de-
politicization” of the union movement (Groh, 72, 179). 
It was in support of these party segments that Bernstein published 
The Preconditions of Socialism. Bernstein’s book gave theoretical 
expression to the reformist aspirations of trade unionists and southern 
SPD sections but Bernstein himself never came to lead or even 
substantially influence these sectors. Thus, when the Revisionist 
controversy led to a vote condemning revisionist theory and strategy at 
the 1899 Hannover and 1903 Dresden congresses, trade unionists 
declined to vigorously support Bernstein. They thought that drawing 
unwanted attention to what was already in fact the reformist practice of 
the unions could potentially imperil their position within the movement. 
Relatively uninterested in theoretical justifications or condemnations of 
their reformism, the unions sprang into open opposition when party 
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policies seemed to be leading their unions into dangerous social or 
political conflict.  
It was the conflicting responses to the severe labor disputes of 1905 
in German industry, following in the wake of the Russian revolution of 
that year, which provided the principal fault line along which the party 
would fracture. Luxemburg, who had left Germany to participate in the 
Russian events, returned with a new conception of the possibilities for 
mass agitation to create social revolution. She called for the party and 
unions to declare and organize a universal, mass strike to halt German 
industry and force radical change. Her demand found a receptive 
audience amongst an undercurrent of factory-based radicals and journals. 
They served as cadres for the burgeoning radical movement, which also 
derived support from a number of important local party sections, such as 
Berlin, Bremen, and Stuttgart (Fülberth, 42).  
This strategic orientation brought the radicals into conflict with the 
unions, which vehemently opposed any further extension of the strike 
movements. The reformist politicians also opposed any radicalization as 
a threat to their long-term efforts to achieve working alliances with left-
leaning bourgeois parties. Kautsky and the party leadership, while 
continuing to oppose the pretensions of the reformists and supporting the 
concept of the mass strike, argued that the strike movement must be 
contained because historical conditions were not yet conducive for a 
revolutionary tactic. Although in 1906 the SPD congress approved a 
compromise for the tactical use of the mass strike, this marked a defeat 
for the radical faction because the resolution refused any offensive 
employment of the tactic and limited its use to extreme situations, such 
as an assault by the government on universal suffrage or the right to 
collectively organize (Potthoff & Miller, 52).  
The mass strike debate took center stage again when demonstrations 
broke out across Prussia in February 1910 in protest against a 
government suffrage bill that left the substance of the three-class voting 
system intact. The unrest swept Germany’s major cities with 
unprecedented intensity and seemed to many to contain the possibility of 
popular insurrection (Groh, 135). Though it had always agitated for 
electoral reform in Prussia, the SPD leadership was caught off guard by a 
movement that it had not organized and whose consequences it feared 
(Groh, 123). Within days the party and union leaderships had agreed not 
to call a mass strike and to work to prevent any radicalization of the 
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demonstrations (Groh, 139-40). The passionate and personal polemic that 
broke out in 1910 between Kautsky and Luxemburg on the strategic or 
tactical purpose of the mass strike exemplified the definitive break 
between radical and centrist elements in the party. While defending the 
principle of a mass strike, Kautsky argued that it was the party’s “last 
weapon” that should only be deployed if the party’s traditional strategy 
or its organization came under immediate threat (Kautsky, 1910a, 33-35). 
He defined any mass strike’s success as the forced adoption by the 
government of the party’s demands. As he viewed this as unlikely in the 
present circumstances, the failure to obtain a far-reaching electoral 
reform would result in widespread disappointment and the de-
mobilization of those sympathetic to the SPD. Calling upon the example 
of the defeat of the Romans by the Germanic tribes, he argued that the 
party’s patient strategy of “exhausting” its enemy remained the best 
means forward (Kautsky, 1910a, 37). The party should channel its 
energies towards winning the next Reichstag elections. His position 
contrasted with that of Bernstein in that he demanded the maintenance of 
the SPD’s demands for an equal and secret franchise rather than 
supporting partial reform, while Bernstein repeatedly urged his Prussian 
comrades to proceed “step by step” and seek a compromise with liberal 
deputies (Bernstein, 1910, 604). Enthusiastic that bourgeois elements 
participated in the first demonstrations in early February, Bernstein later 
noted that they had ceased participating and that no mass strike could 
succeed without sizable support from the middle classes.  
Luxemburg rejected the distinction Kautsky made between a political 
and social strike. She called for the Prussian suffrage demonstrators to 
expand their demands to encompass social and economic issues. Whereas 
Kautsky saw the mass strike as the party’s “last weapon” (Kautsky, 
1910a, 35) Luxemburg said it represented not the “last (...but) the first 
word” (Luxemburg, 1910, 295) a statement that rang ominously in the 
ears of union and party leaders. She saw the mass strike as the best 
opportunity to expand the class war to the non-unionized, a sector of 
society whose value Kautsky doubted because the unorganized only 
knew how to “destroy” (Kautsky, 1911b, 43-49, 77-84, 106-117). 
Incensed that the party worked against the continuation of the 
demonstrations, Luxemburg began to call above the heads of the party 
leadership, asking local sections and union members in her fiery speeches 
and writings to demand that the party adopt radical tactics or pursue them 
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without their leader’s consent (Luxemburg, 1910, 299). Without cease 
Luxemburg attacked Kautsky’s position on the mass strike for the 
following three years, seeking to exploit any opportunity to rekindle the 
Prussian suffrage movement, which re-emerged several times in 
truncated form after having largely died out in April 1910. As 
international crises increased and carried the premonition of European 
war, she argued again and again that the party must deploy the mass 
strike to prevent war, a tactic upon whose efficacy Kautsky on numerous 
occasion cast serious doubt. The mass strike debate provided the 
occasion for Kautsky to clearly differentiate his faction from its 
opponents on its left and right. He reminded his readers in August 1910 
that lying between the country of Luxemburg and the Duchy of Baden 
was the city Trier, Marx’s birthplace (Kautsky, 1910b, 652-67). 
Kautsky and Luxemburg did agree, though, that it was not possible 
for the party to dedicate its work to a mass strike and a parliamentary 
tactic at the same time (Kautsky, 1910a, 79; Luxemburg, 1913c, 259-66). 
The debate that ensued about the possibilities of attaining meaningful 
reform in the Reichstag was not new. In the 1907 Reichstag campaign, 
Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow achieved a victory for conservative 
policies by a direct appeal to the nationalist sentiments of the German 
populace. The widely conflicting responses the election results elicited 
within the SPD show that the positions of the various factions emerging 
from the 1905 agitation had hardened. Reformists argued that the SPD, 
which had lost seats for the first time since the 1880s, had suffered from 
the flight of middle-class supporters due to its revolutionary rhetoric 
(Schorske, 64). Kautsky argued that the election proved the unreliability 
of the middle class and described the election as evidence that class 
conflict was intensifying (Schroske, 66). A newspaper reported that 
Luxemburg told an audience, “Whoever believes that [the election] has 
weakened our power overestimates the influence of parliamentarism.” 
The party was, after all, “a revolutionary mass party” (Luxemburg, 1907, 
193). Thus, the SPD was profoundly split over whether to respond to 
nationalist propaganda by abandoning revolutionary phraseology and 
working to ameliorate German imperialist demands, or by increasing 
their denunciations of German militarism and, thereby, their isolation 
within German society and politics. 
With the end of the Prussian demonstrations and the controversy over 
the Baden section’s vote in support of a budget bill in violation of party 
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discipline, Bebel and Kautsky attempted to rebuild an alliance with the 
radicals on this question but, to their dismay, Luxemburg refused to 
cease her attacks on the party leadership (Groh, 164). Thus the debate 
about the mass strike evolved into a polemic about the purpose of the 
SPD’s presence in parliament and the prospects of that institution for 
achieving core SPD goals. By now it was clear that Kautsky and Bebel 
had moved to the right. Bernstein, of course, had long been won over to a 
strategy of parliamentarism and cooperation with liberal parties, and he 
devoted much attention in his articles to coalitional politics and 
parliamentary debates.  After celebrating the party’s alliance with the 
Left Liberals in the 1912 Reichstag elections, he argued that the new 
parliament showed real promise for reform and, though there existed 
great obstacles to a left coalition, they were not 
“insurmountable” (Bernstein, 1912, 47). Bernstein looked fervently for 
potential alliances with liberal parties on core political questions during 
the remaining years of the Kaiserreich.  
In contrast, Luxemburg had asserted after the 1907 elections that, 
“We no longer have liberalism in Germany nor a bourgeois opposition in 
the German Reichstag” (Luxemburg, 1907, 195). The 1912 electoral 
alliance and the SPD’s success at the polls did nothing to change her 
view. The victory, Luxemburg argued, belonged to the proletariat alone, 
especially because so many more SPD voters honored the agreement to 
vote for Left Liberals in the second round of voting than had their 
partners. She concluded, “The inconsistent, undisciplined mass of liberal 
voters, the majority of whom could move to reaction at any time, is not 
an army with which one can defeat the reaction” (Luxemburg, 1912, 93-
94). Radicals like Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin demanded that the SPD 
deploy “battle tactics” in the new Reichstag and proposed a series of 
measures, including an eight-hour work day, the repeal of all tariffs and 
taxes on food, women’s suffrage, and equal suffrage in Prussia, all of 
which they knew had no prospect of becoming law (Luxemburg, 1912, 
93-94; Groh, 290). Feeling their position vindicated in the following 
years by the paralysis that took hold in the Reichstag, the radicals 
demanded a strategy of uncompromising opposition and 
extraparliamentary agitation. Luxemburg wrote that parliamentarism was 
a dead end because the more the SPD delegation grew in strength, the 
more the ruling class sought refuge in absolutism and drained the 
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Reichstag of any meaningful power. The parliament remained nothing 
more than a “speaking tribune” (Luxemburg, 1913b, 218). 
As the radicals and reformists remained intransigent in their 
strategies, a notable shift had occurred in the center faction. Kautsky 
conceded that parliament was losing power to the executive, but he 
denounced radical claims that there was no hope to be found in a 
parliamentary strategy. He asserted that the parliament was not “without 
power” but presently lacked the “will” to exercise it (Kautsky, 1912, 729-
30). To calls for mass demonstrations, Kautsky countered that not only 
was the SPD parliamentary delegation “impotent,” but so too was mass 
action. Having once condemned any cooperation with bourgeois groups, 
Kautsky now began to carefully differentiate between what he saw to be 
conflicting elements within the bourgeoisie. At the same time Bebel put 
forward the thesis of a peaceful form of trade capitalism (Groh, 220). 
Kautsky argued at the 1911 party congress that the bourgeoisie was 
splitting into antagonistic blocks as large industrialists, Junker agrarians, 
and high finance faced growing opposition from farmers, intellectuals, 
and the “new middle class” (Groh, 221). In a seminal piece entitled “War 
and Peace,” Kautsky asserted that the party should not “underestimate” 
bourgeois movements for peace and disarmament (Kautsky, 1911a, 97-
107). Rather than remaining aloof, he argued, the SPD must throw its 
support behind these efforts. 
Conflicting portrayals of the nature of imperialism and quarrels over 
what the party should do to avoid a war between the European states 
marked the final years of peacetime Social Democracy. For Bernstein, 
armament spending was a perversion that damaged the market. He wrote 
that “national rivalries, racial confrontations, and class struggle 
complicate the operation of the world economy and set back the pure 
economic conditions of the competitive struggle” (Bernstein, 1911c, 
829). When the 1912 Morocco crisis shook Europe, Bernstein faulted not 
a militarist capitalist system, but rather German diplomacy, British 
Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, and French finance (Bernstein, 1912, 
146). He asserted that English imperialism was a progressive force and 
that the free-trade policy of the British Empire was a sound basis for 
peace between the imperialist nations (Schröder, 186-90). The SPD, he 
argued, must campaign for a tariff-free system of international exchange. 
Whereas Bernstein envisioned a future of liberal imperialist harmony, 
Kautsky countered that because imperialism was rooted in the need for 
FOCUS ON GERMAN STUDIES 41 
capital to expand, the threat of conflict could be delayed but never fully 
removed. In the article “World Peace and War” cited above, Kautsky 
argued that though capitalism depended on the expansion of the market 
for its survival, there was no economic necessity for this to take the form 
of conquering territories abroad and, therefore, disarmament was a 
realistic possibility. He expressed hope that an analogous situation to the 
limitation of competition represented by the cartelization of industry 
might develop in the imperial struggle between the European states. 
Though states would jealously guard their sovereignty, a popular 
movement with bourgeois participation might carry through a “revolution 
for peace” and force the creation of a “United States of Europe.” Such a 
construction, which could include “a common trade policy, a federal 
parliament, and a federal command” would “securely found an era of 
eternal peace” (Kautsky, 1911, 105-06).  
An incredulous Luxemburg responded to Kautsky in her article 
“Peace Utopias.” She argued that militarism was the consequence of 
commercial struggle for overseas resources and so disarmament was an 
impossible goal without first overthrowing capitalism. Military spending 
and imperialism were means of prolonging a moribund capitalist system 
and their removal could only result in “stagnation” (Luxemburg, 1911a, 
495-503). The “United States of Europe” was a “lifeless mental 
concoction” that had no economic grounding. Casting an eye on Europe’s 
past, she concluded that it had no political foundation either. Finally, it 
was not even a desirable outcome because she foresaw such a union as 
necessarily engaging in a tariff war with the United States, and a racial 
struggle with the rest of the world. Luxemburg expanded on her analysis 
of the economic causes of imperialism in her 1913 work The 
Accumulation of Capital. In it she describes violence and destruction as 
intrinsic features of the latest stage of capitalism. Free trade was “just a 
passing phase in the history of capitalist accumulation” and British 
actions in China and India gave the lie to Bernstein’s favorable depiction 
of English imperialist practice (Luxemburg, 1913). In lieu of the free 
trade of the 1860s, militarism and imperialism now represented the final 
point of capitalist development, a period in which the capitalist class was 
forced to engage in endemic violence to avert the impending economic 
catastrophe (Luxemburg, 1913a, 430). Parliament and the major voices 
of public opinion served as a platform for the legitimization of capital’s 
need to seize the wealth of the working class through taxation in order to 
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continue the faltering process of capital accumulation (Luxemburg, 
1913a, 443-45). Bernstein’s program amounted to a supplication that 
capitalism and imperialism become “moral,” a futile hope precluded by 
material economic realities (Luxemburg, 1913c, 28). In her view, 
capitalism, imperialism, and militarism constituted a trinity that could not 
be broken without smashing the whole. She considered Kautsky’s idea of 
the resolving of differences between the imperialist states to be a 
dangerous illusion and an obstacle to the only real path to avoid war in 
Europe: a working-class revolt.  
Concurrently the reformist faction came to dominant the leading 
institutions of the party. In 1913 reformists gained control of the party 
executive when party reformist par excellence Friedrich Ebert defeated 
the combined center-radical support for Hugo Haase in the election to 
replace the ailing Bebel (Groh, 203-04). Before becoming party leader, 
Ebert had been charged with turning what was a barely existing party 
structure in 1906 into a professional, salaried party bureaucracy. His 
tremendous efforts transformed the party apparatus into a powerful 
coordinating structure, which aggressively promoted a reformist strategy. 
The radicals, by contrast, had a stronghold in the significantly less 
powerful women’s movement, party schools, and some local sections. 
The severe factional conflicts resulted in a war for control of party 
newspapers across the country and the expulsion in 1912 and 1913 of 
radical voices from most of the leading party organs (Groh, 202-03). On 
the verge of solidifying its control of the party organization, reformists 
had to face the dismaying reality that the severe impasse suffered by the 
Reichstag in 1913-14, an economic recession, and the looming threat of 
war made it such that Luxemburg and her allies were more popular 
among the party masses than they had ever been before (Groh, 199).  
An effort by the government to institute income taxes in order to 
finance a large increase in military spending in spring 1913 posed the 
dilemma facing the severely fractured party in its most acute form to 
date. With Bebel’s support, reformists argued that military spending 
legislation was going to pass regardless and therefore the party should 
support the institution of a tax system that would finance the military 
through higher contributions from richer sectors of society (Groh, 160, 
441). For radicals and many centrists, on the other hand, the struggle 
against militarism was the most important priority, and the creation of the 
income tax, one of the demands of the Erfurt Program, could not erase 
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the effacement of party principles that a vote for armaments spending 
entailed. The divided parliamentary delegation’s decision to vote in favor 
of the bill (Groh, 435) confirmed that a reformist strategy had solidified 
its hold of the SPD during the last years of peace. 
By 1911, radicals among the SPD parliamentary faction were holding 
caucuses separate from their reformist colleagues in order to determine 
common positions and tactics (Schorske, 208). At the 1913 Jena 
Congress, the last congress of the united party, a debate to determine the 
party’s position on military funding became the scene of acrimonious 
exchanges that clearly revealed the extent of division within the party. 
The radical position, demanding not only a refusal of military funding, 
but also the affirmation of an offensive tactic based on the mass strike, 
received 30% support of the assembled delegates (Schorske, 278-79). 
The correlation between local organizations’ support for the radical 
position at the Jena Congress and the organizations which seceded from 
the SPD to form the USPD was nearly absolute (Schorske, 282). A 
succession of intra-party crises over local party autonomy, the Prussian 
suffrage campaign, the debate over parliamentarism and the mass strike, 
and the vote on the 1913 military budget bill, revealed a party already 
definitively polarized between three hostile factions on the eve of the 
First World War. These factions were to serve as the base of support for 





By 1911 the supporters of the various theoretical and strategic 
positions within the Social Democratic Party had coalesced into 
increasingly antagonistic factions. The methods and aims of these 
factions had not only diverged from one another but had become 
mutually exclusive. Each faction saw the tactics of its rivals as 
undermining the principles and position of the SPD. The revolutionary 
rhetoric of the center and radical factions was a clear obstacle to 
reformist efforts to ally with liberal parties in the pursuit of immediate 
reforms. The center viewed the radicals as dangerous agitators whose 
extremism threatened to destroy the party organization, and the 
reformists as unprincipled opportunists who sought to abandon the 
lifeblood of the movement, its Marxist theory. The radicals detested the 
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non-revolutionary, integrationist strategy of the reformists and what they 
viewed as the cowardly immobility of the center. Reformists believed 
that agitation for class conflict and revolution might destroy the 
tremendous advance the trade unions and party had made over the last 
quarter century. The center sensed that the traditional strategy and theory 
of the party was threatened from both sides. By 1911 radicals were 
committed to encouraging efforts to bring down the Imperial 
government.  
These factions came to the conclusion during the First World War 
that they could not achieve their goals within the framework of a unified 
party. As the reformist sectors seemed to be on the threshold of 
succeeding in their efforts to integrate the party and unions into German 
society in the context of the civil truce (Burgfrieden) brought about by 
the First World War, they could no longer tolerate a radical minority 
calling for social revolution and an immediate end to war. The center 
vacillated and regretted the irrelevance the civil truce imposed upon 
them. Many centrists joined the USPD, which reintegrated with the SPD 
in 1922. The radicals had in effect abandoned the “stinking corpse” of 
German Social Democracy long before they were formally expelled in 
1917, and they went on to provide the first cadres of the KPD. The Erfurt 
Synthesis, definitively dead with the vote for war credits on August 4, 
1914, had already in large measure shattered by the time of the labor 
protests of 1910-11. A series of crises over tactical responses to domestic 
and international events had turned those holding mutually exclusive 
theorizations into hostile and antagonistic factions, preparing the ground 
for the schism that followed.  
The schism itself resulted in the relative marginalization of two of the 
theorists whose conflicts had done so much to bring it about. The SPD 
emerged from the war as a clearly reformist body but Bernstein, though 
respected, had little effective influence over its policy. The center 
position largely evaporated and, though Hilferding remained an 
important voice on economic matters, Kautsky was a mostly peripheral 
figure until his death. Luxemburg’s murder in 1919 removed a major 
obstacle to the German Communists falling under the sway of the 
Russian Communist Party, a development Luxemburg is likely to have 
opposed. The German Social Democratic Party and the German 
Communist Party, the split between whom originated in the intra-party 
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cleavages of the turn of the century, remained implacable foes from the 
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2. Bernstein, Kautsky, and Luxemburg were key actors in the congresses 
of the Second International, where these debates within the SPD 
played out on an international stage from the 1900 Paris International 
Congress to the final Congress of 1912 in Basel.  
3. Kautsky, Karl. The Class Struggle, trans. New York W.W. Norton & 
Co., Inc.:, 1971, originally published 1892. 43. 
4. This controversial assertion is based on Karl Marx’s analysis in 
Volume III of Capital, edited and published by Kautsky from Marx’s 
notes in 1895. 
5. Kautsky went on to write, “We know that our objectives can be attained 
only through a revolution, but at the same time we know that it is just 
as little in our power to make this revolution as it is in the power of 
our opponents to prevent it.” 
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6.. Bernstein said on at least one occasion “I am a Fabian.” For the full 
quote see Steinberg, Hans-Josef. “Die Herausbildung des 
Revisionismus von Eduard Bernstein im Lichte des Briefwechsels 
Bernstein-Kautsky” in Bernstein und der Demokratische Sozialismus, 
40; for a discussion of Bernstein’s close personal and intellectual 
relationship with leading Fabians see Hirsch, Helmut. “Die bezüglich 
der Fabian Society transparenten Kommunikationsstrukturen als 
Teilaspekte der internationalen Voraussetzungen der Herausbildung 
des Revisionismus von Eduard Bernstein” in Ibid 47-58. 
7. Quoted in Himmelmann, Gerhard. “Die Rolle der Werttheorie in 
Bernsteins Konzept der politischen Ökonomie des Sozialismus” in 
Bernstein und der Demokratische Sozialismus 313. 
8. Kautsky stated that his disproval of his formerly close friend 
Bernstein’s position was not the cause for Kautsky’s denunciation, 
but rather that “Social liberals” and “Edelanarchisten” might use 
Bernstein’s book to attack the party.  
9. Kautsky wrote, “The expropriation of the exploiting classes presents 
itself purely as a question of power.”  
10. “Finance Capital established Hilferding as the Second International’s 
leading economic thinker” and “Hilferding’s study of capitalism 
came to represent the point of departure for all future radical analyses 
of imperialism and capitalist development.” In William Smaldone. 
Rudolf Hilferding: The Tragedy of a German Social Democrat 
Dekalb: University of Northern Illinois Press, 1998.  40. 
11. Kautsky echoed these words: “If Bernstein believes that we must have 
democracy first, so that we may lead the proletariat to victory step by 
step, I say that the matter is the other way around for us. The victory 
of the proletariat is the precondition of the victory of democracy.” 
Quoted in Gay, Peter. The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: 
Eduard Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1962, 1952. 77. 
12. This is evidenced by Luxemburg’s opposition within the USPD to an 
assault on power in the early days of 1919 because she sensed that the 
USPD had not achieved majority support within the country. When 
she was outvoted in the party, she reluctantly submitted to party 
discipline.  
13. For extensive treatments of the conflicts between the SPD factions in 
this period see Groh’s Negative Integration und revolutionärer 
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Attentismus and Schorske’s German Social Democracy, 1905-1917. 
13. In 1891 the Baden and Hessian party sections became the first to vote 
for regional government bills. In 1894 the  
14. SPD lent its support to a government bill in the Reichstag for the first 
time in a bill to reduce wheat tariffs and thereby lower the price of 
bread for urban workers. See Potthoff, Heinrich & Susanne Miller. 
Kleine Geschichte der SPD, 1848-2002. Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz 
Nachf. GmbH, 2002. 65-66. 
15. From 1890 to 1914 union membership multiplied nine times.  
16. Contrast Bernstein’s statements in “Strasse und Parlament im 
Wahlrechtskampf,” March 10, 1911, 283-86 and “Die Potenz 
politischer Massenstreiks,” April 21, 1911. Sozialistische 
Monatshelfe 1911. 483. 
17. She also traveled to Baden during the debate about the Baden section’s 
budget vote and called for SPD members to oppose their local 
leaders, see Groh, 173-4. 
18. For instance, see Karl Kautsky, “Die neue Taktik” August 2, 9 & 16, 
1912. Die Neue Zeit 1912/13 654-64, 688-98, 723-33. 
18. “The only real tool with which to fight the crimes of war and 
colonialism is the geistige maturity and the decisive will of the 
working class, to transform a heinous world war plotted by capitalist 
interests into a rebellion of the exploited and oppressed to achieve 
world peace and the socialist brotherhood between the peoples.” In 
Rosa Luxemburg, “Marokko” Die Gleichheit (Stuttgart), 1911. 
Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 3 25. 
19. The radicals agreed to support Haase in lieu of their favored choice of 
Wilhelm Dittman. 
20. After initially blaming the Russian government in “Der Krieg, sein 
Urheber und erstes Opfers,” August 13, 1914, Sozialistische 
Monatshelfe 1914, Bernstein later broke with the majority of 
reformists and declared the war a calamitous mistake by the German 
Imperial government. He later became one of few German politicians 
to accept the claim of German guilt imposed on the country by Allied 
victors.  
21. Rosa Luxemburg was scathing in her critique of the undemocratic 
aspects of the Bolshevik Revolution in her 1918 work Die Russische 
Revolution: Eine Kritische Würdigung. 
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